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Abstract
We investigate dynamical stability for strategic communication
with the information structure and perturbations under the replicator
dynamics. To extend the theoretical framework proposed by Green
and Stokey (2007), we study dynamical stability of all equilibria with
the information structure which they introduced. We show that the
rest points of one kind of partition equilibrium and a determinate ac-
tion equilibrium can be stable under the replicator dynamics in the
case where there are two states, two actions, and two observations.
Moreover, we reveal the effects of the information structure and per-
turbations on the dynamical behavior. Without the information struc-
ture, dynamical stability depends on fewer elements of utility functions
and beliefs of an agent and a principal than with the information struc-
ture. Perturbations of the repilicator dynamics can stabilize complete
communication that has an unstable rest point under the replicator
dynamics.
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1 Introduction
We consider the dynamical behavior for strategic communication with the
inforfmation structure and perturbations under the replicator dynamics. In
the strategic communication which is studied in economics (Crawford and
Sobel, 1982, Green and Stokey, 2007), all members communicate through
the strategic use of signals. We study effects of the information structure
and perturbations on the dynamical behavior under the replicator dynamics.
The starting point for analysis is the model of information transmission
as studied by Green and Stokey (2007). In this game, after a state of nature
occurs, an agent receives an observation related to the state through an
information structure and sends it to a principal. The principal takes the
decision. Each utility of the agent and the principal depends on the state
and the action.
In this game, there are sets of equilibria. Following Green and Stokey
(2007), we focus on three types of equilibria: a partition equilibrium, a de-
terminate action equilibrium, and a random action equilibrium. We study
the dynamical behavior of these equilibria in the case where there are two
states, two actions, and two observations. In addition, we suppose that be-
liefs for an agent and a principal are identical.
We first study rest points of these equilibria and dynamical stability of
2
these rest points with the information structure under the replicator dy-
namics. Sequentially, we study effects of the information structure on the
dynamical behavior under the replicator dynamics.
Next, we study the dynamical behavior of complete communication (one
kind of partition equilibrium) under the replicator dynamics with pertur-
bations which is called the selection–mutation dynamics (Hofbauer, 1985).
The dynamical behavior of strategic communication with common interest
under the selection–mutation dynamics is studied by Hofbauer and Huttegger
(2007, 2015) and Uchida and Fukuzumi (2019). Two of them show that per-
turbations of the replicator dynamics can stabilize the dynamical behavior
(Hofbauer and Huttegger, 2007; Uchida and Fukuzumi, 2019).
Our work makes three important contributions:
• We show that a partition equilibrium has a rest point under the replica-
tor dynamics, and that a determinate action equilibrium and a random
action equilibrium can be the rest point under the replicator dynam-
ics. Moreover, we also show that rest points of one kind of partition
equilibrium and a determinate action equilibrium can be stable under
the replicator dynamics.
• We show that without the information structure, the dynamical stabil-
ity of the strategic communication depends on fewer elements of utility
functions and beliefs of an agent and a principal than with the infor-
mation structure.
• We show that a rest point close to complete communication with the in-
formation structure that has an unstable rest point under the replicator
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dynamics can be asymptotically stable under the selection–mutation
dynamics.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
the formal model of strategic communication with the information structure.
Section 3 introduces types of equilibria and Section 4 introduces the dynam-
ics. Section 5 studies the stability of these equilibria under the replicator
dynamics. Section 6 studies the stability of complete communication under
the selection–mutation dynamics. Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
Our decision problems consist of two players; one is an agent and the other
is a principle. There are m states of the world by the set Θ = {θ1, ..., θM},
and N possible observations yn by the set Y = {y1, ..., yN}. An observation
is statistically related to the true state in Θ. The statistical relationship
between states and observations is called the information structure. It is
represented by an M ×N Markov matrix Λ = [λmn]. λmn is the probability
tha yn is observed if the true state is θm. There are k actions by the set
A = {a1, ..., aK}.
An agent receives an observation and sends it to a principal. However,
the agent may not send the same information as he observed. A principal
receives the information from the agent and chooses an action ak from A.
The von Neumann-Morgenstern utility levels of two players depend upon
the action and the state of nature. These utilities are represented by K×M
matrices UAkm = [u
a
km] and U
P
km = [u
p
km] for the principal and the agent. We
4
suppose that all elements of UAkm = [u
a
km] and U
P
km = [u
p
km] are positive. U
A
km
and UPkm for the principal and the agent are realized if θm occurs and ak is
chosen by the principal.
The agent’s strategies are represented by an N ×N Markov matrix
R ∈ R△N×N = {R ∈ RN×N+ :
N∑
j=1
rij = 1, ∀i ∈ N},
where rnn′ is the probability that yn′ was sent given that the actual observa-
tion is yn.
The principal chooses the action ak ∈ A given that the information y′n
was sent by him. The principal’s strategy is represented by an N×K Markov
matrix
Z ∈ R△N×K = {R ∈ RN×K+ :
K∑
i=1
zji = 1, ∀j ∈ N},
where zn′k is the probability that ak is chosen given that yn′ was sent.
We denote different beliefs for the agent and the principal by pi = (pi1, ..., piM) ∈
∆M and pi′ = (pi′1, ..., pi
′
M) ∈ ∆M where ∆M is the set of all M-dimensional
probability vectors.
If the strategy choices are Z and R, the expected utilities for the agent
and the principal are respectively
trΠΛRZUA
and
trΠ′ΛRZUP
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where Π and Π′ denote the square matrices with the vectors pi and pi′ on the
diagonal and zeros elsewhere. 1
Our game Γm,n = {R△N×N × Z△N×K , trUΠΛRZ, trU ′Π′ΛRZ} is described.
We study the Nash equilibria of this game. Let B(Z) ∈ R△N×N and
B(R) ∈ Z△N×K denote the best-response correspondence of R and Z respec-
tively.
Lemma 1. A pair (R,Z) ∈ R△ is a Nash strategy of ΓN,K if and only if
R ∈ B(Z) and Z ∈ B(R).
3 Types of equilibria
ΓN,K has a large set of equilibria. Following Green and Stokey (2007), we
provide basic classifications of equilibria. First, we provide characteristics of
the information structure.
Definition 1 We say that an M ×N ′ information structure Λ′ is a partition
of Λ if Λ′ = ΛPDP ′, where P and P ′ are permutation matrices and D is an
N ×N ′ block diagonal Markov matrix in which each block has rank one.
When Λ′ = ΛPDP ′, there is a partition of the information space Y . If
1The agent’s expected utility is represented by
EUA =
∑
m
pim
∑
n
λmn
∑
n′
rnn′
∑
k
zn′ku
a
km.
The principal’s expected utility is represented by
EUP =
∑
m
pi
′
m
∑
n
λmn
∑
n′
rnn′
∑
k
zn′ku
p
km.
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information value yk occurs under Λ
′, the partition element containing yk is
reported through Λ′.
An equilibrium in this information structure, Λ′ = ΛPDP ′, is called a
partition equilibrium (Green and Stokey, 2007). In this equilibrium, ΛR is
a partition of Λ. In short, the observation that an agent received is sent as
itself or as partitioned information.
Definition 2 (Green and Stokey, 2007) We say that an equilibrium pair
(R,Z) is a partition equilibrium if Λ′ = ΛR is a partition of Λ. One
equilibrium of this type is the pair of strategies R = I, Z = I and RZ = I.
Another equilibrium is the pair of strategies in which Z has at least one
zero-column.
We consider the case in which there are two states, two actions, and two
observations. A partition equilibrium is represented by two forms
R1 =
 1 0
0 1
 , Z1 =
 1 0
0 1
 , R2 =
 α 1− α
α 1− α
 , Z2 =
 1 0
1 0
 , α ∈ [0, 1].
In addition to a partition equilibrium, there are two types of non–partition
equilibria in which a principal uses a pure or mixed strategy.
Definition 3 (Green and Stokey, 2007) We say that an equilibrium pair (R,
Z) is a determinate action equilibrium if Λ′ = ΛR is not a partition of
Λ, and each row of Z receiving positive weight under R has only a single
positive element.
In the case where there are two states, two actions, and two observations,
7
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a determinate action equilibrium is represented as follows:
R3 =
 1− α α
0 1
 , Z3 =
 1 0
0 1
 , 0 < α ≤ 1
2
.
Definition 4 (Green and Stokey, 2007) We say that an equilibrium pair
(R,Z) is a random action equilibrium if Λ′ = ΛR is not a partition of
Λ, and some row of Z receiving positive weight under R has two or more
nonzero entries.
In the case where there are two states, two actions, and two observations,
a random action equilibrium is represented by the form:
R4 =
 12 12
0 1
 , Z4 =
 1 0
α 1− α
 , α ∈ (0, 1).
4 Dynamics
We now consider the replicator dynamics and the selection–mutation dy-
namics on the behavioral strategies, as per Hofbauer and Hutteger (2015).
In an extensive form of this game, a behavioral strategy is represented by a
probability measure over strategies of an agent and a principal.
We define an (n−1)-dimensional behavioral strategy simplex of an agent
when the agent receives an observation i ∈ N , defined by Si, as
Si = {(ri1, ri2, . . . , rin)|
n∑
j=1
rij = 1, rij ≥ 0 for each j ∈ N}.
Similarly, we define a (k − 1)-dimensional behavioral strategy simplex of
8
an principal when the principal receives the information j ∈ N , defined by
Sj, as
Sj = {(zj1, zj2, . . . , zjk)|
n∑
l=1
zjl = 1, zjl ≥ 0 for each j ∈ N}.
The space of behavioral strategies is defined by S = Πi∈NSi × Πj∈KSj.
Our dynamic selection process is described by a dynamical system of
differential equations defined for all points in S. In this paper, we consider
the case in which there are two states, two actions, and two observations.
The dynamical system is formulated as the following 8 differential equations:
r˙11 = r11(pi1λ11z11u
a
11 + pi1λ11z12u
a
21 + pi2λ21z11u
a
12 + pi2λ21z12u
a
22
−pi1λ11r11z11ua11 − pi1λ11r11z12ua21 − pi2λ21r11z11ua12 − pi2λ21r11z12ua22
−pi1λ11r12z21ua11 − pi1λ11r12z22ua21 − pi2λ21r12z21ua12 − pi2λ21r12z22ua22) + ε(1− 2r11),
r˙12 = r12(pi1λ11z21u
a
11 + pi1λ11z22u
a
21 + pi2λ21z21u
a
12 + pi2λ21z22u
a
22
−pi1λ11r12z21ua11 − pi1λ11r12z22ua21 − pi2λ21r12z21ua12 − pi2λ21r12z22ua22
−pi1λ11r11z11ua11 − pi1λ11r11z12ua21 − pi2λ21r11z11ua12 − pi2λ21r11z12ua22) + ε(1− 2r12),
r˙21 = r21(pi1λ12z11u
a
11 + pi1λ12z12u
a
21 + pi2λ22z11u
a
12 + pi2λ22z12u
a
22
−pi1λ12r21z11ua11 − pi1λ12r21z12ua21 − pi2λ22r21z11ua12 − pi2λ22r21z12ua22
−pi1λ12r22z21ua11 − pi1λ12r22z22ua21 − pi2λ22r22z21ua12 − pi2λ22r22z22ua22) + ε(1− 2r21),
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a
11 + pi1λ12z22u
a
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a
12 + pi2λ22z22u
a
22
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p
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22
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where ε and δ are small, uniform mutation rates.
We denote this system by S˙ = Φ(S). This dynamical system is called the
selection–mutation dynamics (Hofbauer, 1985). If ε = δ = 0, the selection–
mutation dynamics coincides with the replicator dynamics.
5 Dynamical stability under the replicator dy-
namics
In this section, we study dynamical stability under the replicator dynamics in the
case where there are two states, two actions, and two observations. In addition,
we suppose that beliefs for an agent and a principal are identical. In the following
results, we first check rest points of three types of equilibria. After that, we study
the dynamical stability of these rest points.
Theorem 5.1. Let (R1, Z1) and (R2, Z2) be partition equilibria of Definition 2
in the case where there are two states, two actions, and two observations. Then,
the partition equilibria (R1, Z1) and (R2, Z2) have rest points under the replica-
tor dynamics. The rest point (R1, Z1) is structurally stable under the replicator
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dynamics when
pi1λ11u
a
21 − pi1λ11ua11 + pi2λ21ua22 − pi2λ21ua12 < 0,
pi1λ12u
a
11 − pi1λ12ua21 + pi2λ22ua12 − pi2λ22ua22 < 0,
pi1λ11u
p
21 − pi1λ11up11 + pi2λ21up22 − pi2λ21up12 < 0,
pi1λ12u
p
11 − pi1λ12up21 + pi2λ22up12 − pi2λ22up22 < 0.
On the other hand, the rest point (R2, Z2) is structurally unstable under the
replicator dynamics.
Theorem 5.2. Let (R,Z) be a determinate action equilibrium in the case where
there are two states, two actions, and two observations. Then, the determinate
action equilibrium has a rest point under the replicator dynamics when
pi1λ11u
a
11 − pi1λ11ua21 + pi2λ21ua12 − pi2λ21ua22 = 0.
The rest point of (R,Z) is structurally stable under the replicator dynamics
when
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11 − pi1λ12ua21 + pi2λ22ua12 − pi2λ22ua22 < 0,
pi1λ11(u
p
21 − up11) + pi2λ21(up22 − up12) < 0,
αpi1λ11(u
p
11 − up21) + pi1λ12(up11 − up21) + αpi2λ21(up12 − up22)− pi2λ22(up12 − up22) < 0.
Theorem 5.3. Let (R,Z) be a random action equilibrium in the case where
there are two states, two actions, and two observations. Then, the random action
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equilibrium has a rest point under the replicator dynamics when
pi1λ11u
a
11 − pi1λ11ua21 + pi2λ21ua12 − pi2λ21ua22 = 0,
1
2pi1λ11u
p
21 − 12pi1λ11up11 + pi1λ12up21 − pi1λ12up11
+12pi2λ21u
p
22 − 12pi2λ21up12 + pi2λ22up22 − pi2λ22up12 = 0.
The rest point of (R,Z) is structurally unstable under the replicator dynamics.
Green and Stokey (2007) studied the welfare of an agent and a principal when
the information structure changes. We also study the role of the information
structure from the point of view of dynamical stability.
Theorem 5.4. Suppose that there is no information structure. Then, the
partition equilibrium (R1, Z1) of Definition 2 has a rest point under the replicator
dynamics. The rest point is structurally stable under the replicator dynamics when
ua21 − ua11 < 0, ua12 − ua22 < 0, up21 − up11 < 0, and up12 − up22 < 0.
Without the information structure, dynamical stability of the partition equilib-
rium (R1, Z1) depends only on utility functions as opposed to with the information
structure.
Theorem 5.5. Suppose that there is no information structure. Then, a deter-
minate action equilibrium (R3, Z3) has a rest point under the replicator dynamics
when
ua11 = u
a
21.
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The rest point is structurally stable under the replicator dynamics when
−αua21 + (1− 2α)ua11 < 0,
(1− 2α)ua21 − (1− α)ua11 < 0,
ua12 − ua22 < 0,
up21 − up11 < 0,
pi1αu
p
11 + pi2u
p
12 − pi1αup21 − pi2up22 < 0.
Without the information structure, the condition of a rest point at a deter-
minate action equilibrium is simply ua11 = u
a
21 regardless of u
a
12, u
a
22, pi1 and pi2 as
opposed to with the information structure. Moreover, the condition of stability
at a determinate action equilibrium depends on fewer elements of utility functions
and beliefs of an agent and a principal than with the information structure.
We can check that a partition equilibrium (R2, Z2) of Definition 2 and a random
action equilibrium without the information structure are structurally unstable. 2
6 Dynamical stability under the selection–mutation
dynamics
Next, we study dynamical stability under the selection–mutation dynamics in the
case where there are two states, two actions, and two observations. In addition,
we suppose that beliefs for an agent and a principal are identical. First, we study
the rest point close to (R1, Z1) under the selection–mutation dynamics.
Theorem 6.1. Consider a partition equilibrium (R1, Z1) in the case where there
are two states, two actions, and two observations. For each pair of the mutation
2We omit the proof of these cases due to lack of space.
13
12 Seigo Uchida
equilibrium has a rest point under the replicator dynamics when
pi1λ11u
a
11 − pi1λ11ua21 + pi2λ21ua12 − pi2λ21ua22 = 0,
1
2pi1λ11u
p
21 − 12pi1λ11up11 + pi1λ12up21 − pi1λ12up11
+12pi2λ21u
p
22 − 12pi2λ21up12 + pi2λ22up22 − pi2λ22up12 = 0.
The rest point of (R,Z) is structurally unstable under the replicator dynamics.
Green and Stokey (2007) studied the welfare of an agent and a principal when
the information structure changes. We also study the role of the information
structure from the point of view of dynamical stability.
Theorem 5.4. Suppose that there is no information structure. Then, the
partition equilibrium (R1, Z1) of Definition 2 has a rest point under the replicator
dynamics. The rest point is structurally stable under the replicator dynamics when
ua21 − ua11 < 0, ua12 − ua22 < 0, up21 − up11 < 0, and up12 − up22 < 0.
Without the information structure, dynamical stability of the partition equilib-
rium (R1, Z1) depends only on utility functions as opposed to with the information
structure.
Theorem 5.5. Suppose that there is no information structure. Then, a deter-
minate action equilibrium (R3, Z3) has a rest point under the replicator dynamics
when
ua11 = u
a
21.
12
The rest point is structurally stable under the replicator dynamics when
−αua21 + (1− 2α)ua11 < 0,
(1− 2α)ua21 − (1− α)ua11 < 0,
ua12 − ua22 < 0,
up21 − up11 < 0,
pi1αu
p
11 + pi2u
p
12 − pi1αup21 − pi2up22 < 0.
Without the information structure, the condition of a rest point at a deter-
minate action equilibrium is simply ua11 = u
a
21 regardless of u
a
12, u
a
22, pi1 and pi2 as
opposed to with the information structure. Moreover, the condition of stability
at a determinate action equilibrium depends on fewer elements of utility functions
and beliefs of an agent and a principal than with the information structure.
We can check that a partition equilibrium (R2, Z2) of Definition 2 and a random
action equilibrium without the information structure are structurally unstable. 2
6 Dynamical stability under the selection–mutation
dynamics
Next, we study dynamical stability under the selection–mutation dynamics in the
case where there are two states, two actions, and two observations. In addition,
we suppose that beliefs for an agent and a principal are identical. First, we study
the rest point close to (R1, Z1) under the selection–mutation dynamics.
Theorem 6.1. Consider a partition equilibrium (R1, Z1) in the case where there
are two states, two actions, and two observations. For each pair of the mutation
2We omit the proof of these cases due to lack of space.
13
  13Dynamical stability in strategic communication with the information structure and perturbations
The rest poin is structurally stable under the replicator dynamics when
−αua21 + (1− 2α)ua11 < 0,
(1− 2α)ua21 − (1− α)ua11 < 0,
ua12 − ua22 < 0,
up21 − up11 < 0,
pi1αu
p
11 + pi2u
p
12 − pi1αup21 − pi2up22 < 0.
With ut he information structure, the cond tion of a rest point at a deter-
m nate action equilibrium is simply ua11 = 21 regardless of u
a
12, u
a
22, pi1 and pi2 as
opposed to with he information structure. Moreover, the condition of stability
t a determinate action equilibrium depends on fewer elements of utility functions
nd beliefs of a agen and a principal than with he information structure.
We can check that a partition equilibrium (R2, Z2) of Definition 2 and a random
act on equilibrium with ut he information s ructure are structurally unstable. 2
6 Dynamical stability under the selecti –mutation
dynamics
Next, we udy dynamical stabili y under the selection–muta ion dynamics in the
case here here are tw states, actions, and two observations. In addition,
we suppose that beliefs for a agent an a principal are identical. First, we study
the rest point clos to (R1, Z1) under the selection–mutation dynamics.
Theor m 6.1. Consider a partition equ librium (R1, Z1) in the case where there
are tw tates, actions, and tw observat ons. For each pair of the mutation
2We omit th proof f these cases due to lack of space.
13
The rest point is structurally stable under the replicator dynamics when
−αua21 + (1− 2α)ua11 < 0,
(1− 2α)ua21 − (1− α)ua11 < 0,
ua12 − ua22 < 0,
up21 − up11 < 0,
pi1αu
p
11 + pi2u
p
12 − pi1αup21 − pi2up22 < 0.
Without the information structure, the condition of a rest point at a deter-
minate action equilibrium is simply ua11 = u
a
21 regardless of u
a
12, u
a
22, pi1 and pi2 as
opposed to with the information structure. Moreover, the condition of stability
at a det rminate action equilibrium depends on fewer elements of utility functions
and beliefs of an agent and a principal than with the information structure.
We can check that a partition equilibrium (R2, Z2) of Definition 2 and a random
action equilibrium without the information structure are structurally unstable. 2
6 Dynamical stability under the selection–mut tion
dynamics
Next, we study dynamical stability under the selection–mutation dynamics in the
case where there are two states, two actions, and two observations. In addition,
we suppose that beliefs for an agent and a principal are identical. First, we study
the rest point close to (R1, Z1) under the selection–mutation dynamics.
Theorem 6.1. Consider a partition equilibrium (R1, Z1) in the case where there
are two states, two actions, and two observations. For each pair of the mutation
2We omit the proof of these cases due to lack of space.
13
14 Seigo Uchida
rates (ε, δ), there is a neighborhood of the partition equilibrium (R1, Z1) that
contains a unique rest point (R∗1(ε, δ), Z∗1 (ε, δ)) when
pi1λ11u
a
21 + pi2λ21u
a
22 − pi1λ11ua11 − pi2λ21ua12 ̸= 0,
pi1λ12u
a
11 + pi2λ22u
a
12 − pi1λ12ua21 − pi2λ22ua22 ̸= 0,
pi1λ11u
p
21 + pi2λ21u
p
22 − pi1λ11up11 − pi2λ21up12 ̸= 0,
pi1λ12u
p
11 + pi2λ22u
p
12 − pi1λ12up21 − pi2λ22up22 ̸= 0.
We find a rest point close to a partition equilibrium (R1, Z1) under the selection–
mutation dynamics. We can show the value of the rest point explicitly.
Corollary 1. The first–order approximated entries of the rest point (R(ε, δ), Z(ε, δ))
∈ S close to a partition equilibrium (R1, Z1) are explicitly given as follows:
R1 =
 1− 1pi1λ11ua11+pi2λ21ua12−pi1λ11ua21−pi2λ21ua22 ε 1pi1λ11ua11+pi2λ21ua12−pi1λ11ua21−pi2λ21ua22 ε
1
pi1λ12ua21+pi2λ22u
a
22−pi1λ12ua11−pi2λ22ua12 ε 1−
1
pi1λ12ua21+pi2λ22u
a
22−pi1λ12ua11−pi2λ22ua12 ε
,
Z1 =
 1− 1pi1λ11up11+pi2λ21up12−pi1λ11up21−pi2λ21up22 δ 1pi1λ11up11+pi2λ21up12−pi1λ11up21−pi2λ21up22 δ
1
pi1λ12u
p
21+pi2λ22u
p
22−pi1λ12up11−pi2λ22up12
δ 1− 1
pi1λ12u
p
21+pi2λ22u
p
22−pi1λ12up11−pi2λ22up12
δ.
.
We can study the stability of a rest point under the selection–mutation dy-
namics by using these values of Corollary 1.
Theorem 6.2. Consider a partition equilibrium (R1, Z1) that has an unstable
rest point under the replicator dynamics in the case where there are two states,
two actions, and two observations. Then, the rest point close to the corresponding
partition equilibrium (R∗1, Z∗1 ) can be asymptotically stable under the selection–
mutation dynamics.
Perturbations of the replicator dynamics can stabilize the dynamical behavior
for the strategic communication of Green and Stokey (2007) type, following the
14
dynamical behavior for the sender–receiver game of Lewis type (Hofbauer and
Huttegger, 2007, Uchida and Fukuzumi, 2019). In this paper, we do not study
stability of the other equilibrium under the selection–mutation dynamics because
it is too difficult to solve the characteristic equation of the first-order approximated
Jacobian matrix evaluated at the rest point.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the rest points and dynamical stability for the strategic
communication with the information structure and perturbations. With the infor-
mation structure, the existence of rest points and dynamical stability for strategic
communication depends on more elements of utility functions and more beliefs
of the agent and the principal than without the information structure. On the
other hand, perturbations of the replicator dynamics can stabilize the dynamical
behavior of complete communication that has an unstable rest point under the
replicator dynamics.
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of the agent and the principal than without the information structure. On the
other hand, perturbations of the replicator dynamics can stabilize the dynamical
behavior of complete communication that has an unstable rest point under the
replicator dynamics.
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̸
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(ε, δ), there is a neighborho d of the parti on equilibrium (R1, Z1) that
i s a unique rest point (R∗1(ε, δ), Z∗1 (ε, δ)) when
pi1λ1 u
a
21 + pi2λ21u
a
2 − pi1λ11ua11 − pi2λ21ua12 ̸= 0,
pi1λ12u
a
1 + pi2λ2 u
a
12 − pi1λ12ua21 − pi2λ22ua22 ̸= 0,
pi1λ1 u
p
21 + pi2λ21u
p
2 − pi1λ11up11 − pi2λ21up12 ̸= 0,
pi1λ12u
p
1 + pi2λ2 u
p
12 − pi1λ12up21 − pi2λ22up22 ̸= 0.
fi d a rest point close to a partition equil brium (R1, Z1) under the selection–
ti dyna ics. e can show the value of the rest point explic tly.
ll r 1. The first–order ap roximated entries of the rest point (R(ε, δ), Z(ε, δ))
l se to a partition equilibrium (R1, Z1) are explic tly given as follows:
1 1pi1λ1 ua1 +pi2λ21ua12−pi1λ11ua21−pi2λ21ua22 ε
1
pi1λ11ua11+pi2λ 1u
a
12−pi1λ 1ua21−pi2λ21ua22 ε
1
pi1λ12ua21+pi2λ2 u
a
2 −pi1λ12ua11−pi2λ22ua12 ε 1−
1
pi1λ12ua21+pi2λ 2u
a
22−pi1λ 2ua11−pi2λ22ua12 ε
,
1 1
pi1λ1 u
p
1 +pi2λ21u
p
12−pi1λ11up21−pi2λ21up22
δ 1
pi1λ11u
p
11+pi2λ 1u
p
12−pi1λ 1up21−pi2λ21up22
δ
1
pi1λ12u
p
21+pi2λ2 u
p
2 −pi1λ12up11−pi2λ22up12
δ 1− 1
pi1λ12u
p
21+pi2λ 2u
p
22−pi1λ 2up11−pi2λ22up12
δ.
.
can study the stability of a rest point under the sel ction–muta ion dy-
i s y using these values of Corollary 1.
6.2. Consider a partition equil brium (R1, Z1) that has an unstable
i t under the replicator dynamics in the case wher ther are two sta es,
tio s, and two observations. Then, the rest point close to the corresponding
iti equilibrium (R∗1, Z∗1 ) can be asymptotically stable under the selection–
ti dyna ics.
rt rbations of the replicator dynamics can stabilize the dynamical behavior
strategic communication of Gre n and Stokey (2007) type, following the
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 5.1
We consider the case in which there are two states, two actions, and two
observations:
Λ =
 λ11 λ12
λ21 λ22
 , UA =
 ua11 ua12
ua21 u
a
22
 , UP =
 up11 up12
up21 u
p
22
 , piA = piP = (pi1, pi2).
Partition equilibria are represented by two forms:
R1 =
 1 0
0 1
 , Z1 =
 1 0
0 1
 , R2 =
 α 1− α
α 1− α
 , Z2 =
 1 0
1 0
 .
Our dynamical system S′ = Φ′(S) of the replicator dynamics consists of 8
differential equations:
r˙11 = r11(pi1λ11z11u
a
11 + pi1λ11z12u
a
21 + pi2λ21z11u
a
12 + pi2λ21z12u
a
22
−pi1λ11r11z11ua11 − pi1λ11r11z12ua21 − pi2λ21r11z11ua12 − pi2λ21r11z12ua22
−pi1λ11r12z21ua11 − pi1λ11r12z22ua21 − pi2λ21r12z21ua12 − pi2λ21r12z22ua22),
r˙12 = r12(pi1λ11z21u
a
11 + pi1λ11z22u
a
21 + pi2λ21z21u
a
12 + pi2λ21z22u
a
22
−pi1λ11r12z21ua11 − pi1λ11r12z22ua21 − pi2λ21r12z21ua12 − pi2λ21r12z22ua22
−pi1λ11r11z11ua11 − pi1λ11r11z12ua21 − pi2λ21r11z11ua12 − pi2λ21r11z12ua22),
r˙21 = r21(pi1λ12z11u
a
11 + pi1λ12z12u
a
21 + pi2λ22z11u
a
12 + pi2λ22z12u
a
22
−pi1λ12r21z11ua11 − pi1λ12r21z12ua21 − pi2λ22r21z11ua12 − pi2λ22r21z12ua22
−pi1λ12r22z21ua11 − pi1λ12r22z22ua21 − pi2λ22r22z21ua12 − pi2λ22r22z22ua22),
r˙22 = r22(pi1λ12z21u
a
11 + pi1λ12z22u
a
21 + pi2λ22z21u
a
12 + pi2λ22z22u
a
22
−pi1λ12r22z21ua11 − pi1λ12r22z22ua21 − pi2λ22r22z21ua12 − pi2λ22r22z22ua22
−pi1λ12r21z11ua11 − pi1λ12r21z12ua21 − pi2λ22r21z11ua12 − pi2λ22r21z12ua22),
16
z˙11 = z11(pi1λ11r11u
p
11 + pi1λ12r21u
p
11 + pi2λ21r11u
p
12 + pi2λ22r21u
p
12
−pi1λ11r11z11up11 − pi1λ12r21z11up11 − pi2λ21r11z11up12 − pi2λ22r21z11up12
−pi1λ11r11z12up21 − pi1λ12r21z12up21 − pi2λ21r11z12up22 − pi2λ22r21z12up22),
z˙12 = z12(pi1λ11r11u
p
21 + pi1λ12r21u
p
21 + pi2λ21r11u
p
22 + pi2λ22r21u
p
22
−pi1λ11r11z12up21 − pi1λ12r21z12up21 − pi2λ21r11z12up22 − pi2λ22r21z12up22
−pi1λ11r11z11up11 − pi1λ12r21z11up11 − pi2λ21r11z11up12 − pi2λ22r21z11up12),
z˙21 = z21(pi1λ11r12u
p
11 + pi1λ12r22u
p
11 + pi2λ21r12u
p
12 + pi2λ22r22u
p
12
−pi1λ11r12z22up21 − pi1λ12r22z22up21 − pi2λ21r12z22up22 − pi2λ22r22z22up22
−pi1λ11r12z21up11 − pi1λ12r22z21up11 − pi2λ21r12z21up12 − pi2λ22r22z21up12),
z˙22 = z22(pi1λ11r12u
p
21 + pi1λ12r22u
p
21 + pi2λ21r12u
p
22 + pi2λ22r22u
p
22
−pi1λ11r12z22up21 − pi1λ12r22z22up21 − pi2λ21r12z22up22 − pi2λ22r22z22up22
−pi1λ11r12z21up11 − pi1λ12r22z21up11 − pi2λ21r12z21up12 − pi2λ22r22z21up12).
By substituting the entries of (R1, Z1) and (R2, Z2) into the above equations,
we obtain rij = 0 and zji = 0 for each i, j ∈ (1, 2). Thus, this system has rest
points at the partition equilibria (R1, Z1) and (R2, Z2).
Sequentially, we check dynamical stability of the partition equilibrium (Z1, R1).
The characteristic equation of the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the rest point
(Z1, R1) is given by
(λ+pi1λ11u
a
11+pi2λ21u
a
12)(λ−pi1λ11ua21−pi2λ21ua22+pi1λ11ua11+pi2λ21ua12)(λ−
pi1λ12u
a
11−pi2λ22ua12+pi1λ12ua21+pi2λ22ua22)(λ+pi1λ12ua21+pi2λ22ua22)(λ+pi1λ11up11+
pi2λ21u
p
12)(λ−pi1λ11up21−pi2λ21up22+pi1λ11up11+pi2λ21up12)(λ−pi1λ12up11−pi2λ22up12+
pi1λ12u
p
21 + pi2λ22u
p
22)(λ+ pi1λ12u
p
21 + pi2λ22u
p
22) = 0, where λ is the eigenvalue.
Thus, this system is structurally stable when
pi1λ11u
a
21 − pi1λ11ua11 + pi2λ21ua22 − pi2λ21ua12 < 0,
pi1λ12u
a
11 − pi1λ12ua21 + pi2λ22ua12 − pi2λ22ua22 < 0,
pi1λ11u
p
21 − pi1λ11up11 + pi2λ21up22 − pi2λ21up12 < 0,
pi1λ12u
p
11 − pi1λ12up21 + pi2λ22up12 − pi2λ22up22 < 0.
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p
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p
11 + pi1λ12r22u
p
11 + pi2λ21r12u
p
12 + pi2λ22r22u
p
12
−pi1λ11r12z22up21 − pi1λ12r22z22up21 − pi2λ21r12z22up22 − pi2λ22r22z22up22
−pi1λ11r12z21up11 − pi1λ12r22z21up11 − pi2λ21r12z21up12 − pi2λ22r22z21up12),
z˙22 = z22(pi1λ11r12u
p
21 + pi1λ12r22u
p
21 + pi2λ21r12u
p
22 + pi2λ22r22u
p
22
−pi1λ11r12z22up21 − pi1λ12r22z22up21 − pi2λ21r12z22up22 − pi2λ22r22z22up22
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By substituting the entries of (R1, Z1) and (R2, Z2) into the above equations,
we obtain rij = 0 and zji = 0 for each i, j ∈ (1, 2). Thus, this system has rest
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Sequentially, we check dynamical stability of the partition equilibrium (Z1, R1).
The characteristic equation of the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the rest point
(Z1, R1) is given by
(λ+pi1λ11u
a
11+pi2λ21u
a
12)(λ−pi1λ11ua21−pi2λ21ua22+pi1λ11ua11+pi2λ21ua12)(λ−
pi1λ12u
a
11−pi2λ22ua12+pi1λ12ua21+pi2λ22ua22)(λ+pi1λ12ua21+pi2λ22ua22)(λ+pi1λ11up11+
pi2λ21u
p
12)(λ−pi1λ11up21−pi2λ21up22+pi1λ11up11+pi2λ21up12)(λ−pi1λ12up11−pi2λ22up12+
pi1λ12u
p
21 + pi2λ22u
p
22)(λ+ pi1λ12u
p
21 + pi2λ22u
p
22) = 0, where λ is the eigenvalue.
Thus, this system is structurally stable when
pi1λ11u
a
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pi1λ12u
a
11 − pi1λ12ua21 + pi2λ22ua12 − pi2λ22ua22 < 0,
pi1λ11u
p
21 − pi1λ11up11 + pi2λ21up22 − pi2λ21up12 < 0,
pi1λ12u
p
11 − pi1λ12up21 + pi2λ22up12 − pi2λ22up22 < 0.
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Sequentially, we check the dynamical stability of the partition equilibrium
(Z2, R2). The characteristic equation of the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the
rest point (Z2, R2) has eight eigenvalues. One of them is zero. Thus, this system
is structually unstable.
Proof of Theorem 5.2
A determinate action equilibrium is represented by the form:
R3 =
 1− α α
0 1
 , Z3 =
 1 0
0 1
 .
By substituting the entries of (R3, Z3) into our dynamical system S
′ = Φ′(S),
we obtain rij = 0 and zji = 0 for each i, j ∈ (1, 2);
r˙11 = (1− α)(αpi1λ11ua11 + αpi2λ21ua12 − αpi1λ11ua21 − αpi2λ21ua22) = 0,
r˙12 = α((1− α)pi1λ11ua21 − (1− α)pi1λ11ua11 + (1− α)pi2λ21ua22 − (1− α)pi2λ21ua12) = 0,
r˙21 = 0,
r˙22 = 0,
z˙11 = 0,
z˙12 = 0,
z˙21 = 0,
z˙22 = 0.
Thus, this system has the rest point when pi1λ11u
a
11 + pi2λ21u
a
12 − pi1λ11ua21 −
pi2λ21u
a
22 = 0.
Next, we check the dynamical stability of the determinate action equilib-
rium (Z3, R3). The characteristic equation of the Jacobian matrix evaluated at
the rest point (Z3, R3) is given by (λ − (2α − 1)pi1λ11ua11 − (2α − 1)pi2λ21ua12 +
αpi1λ11u
a
21+αpi2λ21u
a
22)(λ−(1−2α)pi1λ11ua21−(1−2α)pi2λ21ua22+(1−α)pi1λ11ua11+
(1− α)pi2λ21ua12)(λ− pi1λ12ua11 − pi2λ22ua12 + pi1λ12ua21 + pi2λ22ua22)(λ+ pi1λ12ua21 +
pi2λ22u
a
22)(λ + (1 − α)pi1λ11up11 + (1 − α)pi2λ21up12)(λ − (1 − α)pi1λ11up21 + (1 −
18
α)pi1λ11u
p
11 − (1 − α)pi2λ21up22 + (1 − α)pi2λ21up12)(λ − αpi1λ11up11 + αpi1λ11up21 −
pi1λ12u
p
11+pi1λ12u
p
21−αpi2λ21up12+αpi2λ21up22−pi2λ22up12+pi2λ22up22)(λ+pi1λ11up21+
pi1λ12u
p
21 + pi2λ21u
p
22 + pi2λ22u
p
22) = 0.
Thus, this system is structurally stable when
(2α− 1)pi1λ11ua11 + (2α− 1)pi2λ21ua12 − αpi1λ11ua21 − αpi2λ21ua22) < 0,
(1− 2α)pi1λ11ua21 + (1− 2α)pi2λ21ua22 − (1− α)pi1λ11ua11 − (1− α)pi2λ21ua12) < 0,
pi1λ12u
a
11 − pi1λ12ua21 + pi2λ22ua12 − pi2λ22ua22 < 0,
pi1λ11(u
p
21 − up11) + pi2λ21(up22 − up12) < 0,
αpi1λ11(u
p
11 − up21) + pi1λ12(up11 − up21) + αpi2λ21(up12 − up22)− pi2λ22(up12 − up22) < 0.
Proof of Theorem 5.3
A random action equilibrium is represented by the form:
R4 =
 12 12
0 1
 , Z4 =
 1 0
α 1− α
 .
By substituting the entries of (R4, Z4) into our dynamical system S
′ = Φ′(S),
we obtain rij = 0 and zji = 0 for each i, j ∈ (1, 2):
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
r˙11 =
1
2((
1
2 − 12α)pi1λ11ua11 + (12 − 12α)pi2λ21ua12
−(12 − 12α)pi1λ11ua21 − (12 − 12α)pi2λ21ua22) = 0,
r˙12 =
1
2((
1
2 − 12α)pi1λ11ua11 + (12 − 12α)pi2λ21ua12
−(12 − 12α)pi1λ11ua21 − (12 − 12α)pi2λ21ua22) = 0,
r˙21 = 0,
r˙22 = 0,
z˙11 = 0,
z˙12 = 0,
z˙21 = α(−12pi1λ11up21 − pi1λ12up21 − 12pi2λ21up22 − pi2λ22up22
+12pi1λ11u
p
11 + pi1λ12u
p
11 +
1
2pi2λ21u
p
12 + pi2λ22u
p
12) = 0,
z˙22 = (1− α)(12pi1λ11up21 + pi1λ12up21 + 12pi2λ21up22 + pi2λ22up22
−12pi1λ11up11 − pi1λ12up11 − 12pi2λ21up12 − pi2λ22up12) = 0.
Thus, this system has the rest point at the random action equilibrium (R4, Z4)
when pi1λ11u
a
11 − pi1λ11ua21 + pi2λ21ua12 − pi2λ21ua22 = 0, 12pi1λ11up21 − 12pi1λ11up11 +
pi1λ12u
p
21 − pi1λ12up11 + 12pi2λ21up22 − 12pi2λ21up12 + pi2λ22up22 − pi2λ22up12 = 0.
Next, we check the stability of the random action equilibrium (R4, Z4). The
characteristic equation of the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the rest point (R4, Z4)
has eight eigenvalues. One of them is zero. Thus, this system is structurally
unstable.
Proof of Theorem 5.4
We consider the case in which there is no information structure. Our dynamical
system of the replicator dynamics consists of 8 differential equations:
20

r˙11 = r11(pi1z11u
a
11 + pi1z12u
a
21 − pi1r11z11ua11 − pi1r11z12ua21 − pi1r12z21ua11 − pi1r12z22ua21),
r˙12 = r12(pi1z21u
a
11 + pi1z22u
a
21 − pi1r12z21ua11 − pi1r12z22ua21 − pi1r11z11ua11 − pi1r11z12ua21),
r˙21 = r21(pi2z11u
a
12 + pi2z12u
a
22 − pi2r21z11ua12 − pi2r21z12ua22 − pi2r22z21ua12 − pi2r22z22ua22),
r˙22 = r22(pi2z21u
a
12 + pi2z22u
a
22 − pi2r22z21ua12 − pi2r22z22ua22 − pi2r21z11ua12 − pi2r21z12ua22),
z˙11 = z11(pi1r11u
p
11 + pi2r21u
p
12 − pi1r11z11up11 − pi2r21z11up12 − pi1r11z12up21 − pi2r21z12up22),
z˙12 = z12(pi1r11u
p
21 + pi2r21u
p
22 − pi1r11z12up21 − pi2r21z12up22 − pi1r11z11up11 − pi2r21z11up12),
z˙21 = z21(pi1r12u
p
11 + pi2r22u
p
12 − pi1r12z22up21 − pi2r22z22up22 − pi1r12z21up11 − pi2r22z21up12),
z˙22 = z22(pi1r12u
p
21 + pi2r22u
p
22 − pi1r12z22up21 − pi2r22z22up22 − pi1r12z21up11 − pi2r22z21up12).
By substituting the entries of (R1, Z1) into the above equations, we obtain
rij = 0 and zji = 0 for each i, j ∈ (1, 2). Thus, this system has rest points at the
partition equilibrium (R1, Z1).
Sequentially, we study the dynamical stability of these rest points. The char-
acteristic equation of the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the rest point (Z1, R1) is
given by (λ+pi1u
a
11)(λ−pi1ua21+pi1ua11)(λ−pi2ua12+pi2ua22)(λ+pi2ua22)(λ+pi1up11)(λ−
pi1u
p
22 + pi1u
p
11)(λ− pi2up12 + pi2up22)(λ+ pi2up22) = 0, where λ is the eigenvalue.
Thus, this system is structurally stable when ua21−ua11 < 0, ua12−ua22 < 0, up22−
up11 < 0, and u
p
12 − up22 < 0.
Proof of Theorem 5.5
As with Theorem 5.4, by substituting the entries of (R4, Z4) into our dynamical
system of Proof of Theorem 5.4, we obtain rij = 0 and zji = 0 for each i, j ∈ (1, 2):
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r˙11 =
1
2((
1
2 − 12α)pi1λ11ua11 + (12 − 12α)pi2λ21ua12
−(12 − 12α)pi1λ11ua21 − (12 − 12α)pi2λ21ua22) = 0,
r˙12 =
1
2((
1
2 − 12α)pi1λ11ua11 + (12 − 12α)pi2λ21ua12
−(12 − 12α)pi1λ11ua21 − (12 − 12α)pi2λ21ua22) = 0,
r˙21 = 0,
r˙22 = 0,
z˙11 = 0,
z˙12 = 0,
z˙21 = α(−12pi1λ11up21 − pi1λ12up21 − 12pi2λ21up22 − pi2λ22up22
+12pi1λ11u
p
11 + pi1λ12u
p
11 +
1
2pi2λ21u
p
12 + pi2λ22u
p
12) = 0,
z˙22 = (1− α)(12pi1λ11up21 + pi1λ12up21 + 12pi2λ21up22 + pi2λ22up22
−12pi1λ11up11 − pi1λ12up11 − 12pi2λ21up12 − pi2λ22up12) = 0.
Thus, this system has the rest point at the random action equilibrium (R4, Z4)
when pi1λ11u
a
11 − pi1λ11ua21 + pi2λ21ua12 − pi2λ21ua22 = 0, 12pi1λ11up21 − 12pi1λ11up11 +
pi1λ12u
p
21 − pi1λ12up11 + 12pi2λ21up22 − 12pi2λ21up12 + pi2λ22up22 − pi2λ22up12 = 0.
Next, we check the stability of the random action equilibrium (R4, Z4). The
characteristic equation of the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the rest point (R4, Z4)
has eight eigenvalues. One of them is zero. Thus, this system is structurally
unstable.
Proof of Theorem 5.4
We consider the case in which there is no information structure. Our dynamical
system of the replicator dynamics consists of 8 differential equations:
20

r˙11 = r11(pi1z11u
a
11 + pi1z12u
a
21 − pi1r11z11ua11 − pi1r11z12ua21 − pi1r12z21ua11 − pi1r12z22ua21),
r˙12 = r12(pi1z21u
a
11 + pi1z22u
a
21 − pi1r12z21ua11 − pi1r12z22ua21 − pi1r11z11ua11 − pi1r11z12ua21),
r˙21 = r21(pi2z11u
a
12 + pi2z12u
a
22 − pi2r21z11ua12 − pi2r21z12ua22 − pi2r22z21ua12 − pi2r22z22ua22),
r˙22 = r22(pi2z21u
a
12 + pi2z22u
a
22 − pi2r22z21ua12 − pi2r22z22ua22 − pi2r21z11ua12 − pi2r21z12ua22),
z˙11 = z11(pi1r11u
p
11 + pi2r21u
p
12 − pi1r11z11up11 − pi2r21z11up12 − pi1r11z12up21 − pi2r21z12up22),
z˙12 = z12(pi1r11u
p
21 + pi2r21u
p
22 − pi1r11z12up21 − pi2r21z12up22 − pi1r11z11up11 − pi2r21z11up12),
z˙21 = z21(pi1r12u
p
11 + pi2r22u
p
12 − pi1r12z22up21 − pi2r22z22up22 − pi1r12z21up11 − pi2r22z21up12),
z˙22 = z22(pi1r12u
p
21 + pi2r22u
p
22 − pi1r12z22up21 − pi2r22z22up22 − pi1r12z21up11 − pi2r22z21up12).
By substituting the entries of (R1, Z1) into the above equations, we obtain
rij = 0 and zji = 0 for each i, j ∈ (1, 2). Thus, this system has rest points at the
partition equilibrium (R1, Z1).
Sequentially, we study the dynamical stability of these rest points. The char-
acteristic equation of the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the rest point (Z1, R1) is
given by (λ+pi1u
a
11)(λ−pi1ua21+pi1ua11)(λ−pi2ua12+pi2ua22)(λ+pi2ua22)(λ+pi1up11)(λ−
pi1u
p
22 + pi1u
p
11)(λ− pi2up12 + pi2up22)(λ+ pi2up22) = 0, where λ is the eigenvalue.
Thus, this system is structurally stable when ua21−ua11 < 0, ua12−ua22 < 0, up22−
up11 < 0, and u
p
12 − up22 < 0.
Proof of Theorem 5.5
As with Theorem 5.4, by substituting the entries of (R4, Z4) into our dynamical
system of Proof of Theorem 5.4, we obtain rij = 0 and zji = 0 for each i, j ∈ (1, 2):
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r˙11 = pi1u
a
11 − pi1(1− α)ua11 − pi1αua21 = 0,
r˙12 = pi1u
a
21 − pi1αua21 − pi1(1− α)ua11 = 0,
r˙22 = 0,
z˙11 = 0,
z˙12 = 0,
z˙21 = 0,
z˙22 = 0.
Thus, this system has the rest point at the random action equilibrium (R4, Z4)
when ua11 = u
a
21.
Next, we check the stability of the random action equilibrium (R4, Z4). The
characteristic equation of the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the rest point (R4, Z4)
is given by
(λ+αua21− (1− 2α)ua11)(λ− (1− 2α)ua21+ (1−α)ua11)(λ− pi1ua12+ pi2ua22)(λ+
pi2u
a
22)(λ+ (1− α)pi1up11)(λ+ (1− α)pi1up21 + (1− α)pi1up11)(λ− pi1αup11 − pi2up12 +
pi1αu
p
21 + pi2u
p
22)(λ+ pi1αu
p
21 + pi2u
p
22) = 0, where λ is the eigenvalue.
Thus, this system can be structurally stable when −αua21 + (1 − 2α)ua11 <
0, (1− 2α)ua21− (1−α)ua11 < 0, pi2ua12− pi2ua22 < 0, up21− up11 < 0, pi1αup11+ pi2up12−
pi1αu
p
21 − pi2up22 < 0.
Proof of Theorem 6.1
Assuming that there is a rest point close to a partition equilibrium (R1, Z1),
we write down the rest point as follows:
R1 =
 1− ε1 ε1
ε2 1− ε2
 , Z1 =
 1− δ1 δ1
δ2 1− δ2
 .
Our dynamical system S˙ = Φ(S) of the selection–mutation dynamics consists
22
of 8 differential equations. 3 By substituting the entries (z˜ij , r˜ji) of (R
∗
1, Z
∗
1 ) into
8 differential equations, we obtain the following system:
r˙11 = (1− ε1)(pi1λ11(1− δ1)ua11 + pi1λ11δ1ua21 + pi2λ21(1− δ1)ua12 + pi2λ21δ1ua22
−pi1λ11(1− ε1)(1− δ1)ua11 − pi1λ11(1− ε1)δ1ua21 − pi2λ21(1− ε1)(1− δ1)ua12 − pi2λ21(1− ε1)δ1ua22
−pi1λ11ε1δ2ua11 − pi1λ11ε1(1− δ2)ua21 − pi2λ21ε1δ2ua12 − pi2λ21ε1(1− δ2)ua22)
+ε(1− 2(1− ε1)),
r˙12 = ε1(pi1λ11δ2u
a
11 + pi1λ11(1− δ2)ua21 + pi2λ21δ2ua12 + pi2λ21(1− δ2)ua22
−pi1λ11ε1δ2ua11 − pi1λ11ε1(1− δ2)ua21 − pi2λ21ε1δ2ua12 − pi2λ21ε1(1− δ2)ua22
−pi1λ11(1− ε1)(1− δ1)ua11 − pi1λ11(1− ε1)δ1ua21 − pi2λ21(1− ε1)(1− δ1)ua12 − pi2λ21(1− ε1)δ1ua22)
+ε(1− 2ε1),
r˙21 = ε2(pi1λ12(1− δ1)ua11 + pi1λ12δ1ua21 + pi2λ22(1− δ1)ua12 + pi2λ22δ1ua22
−pi1λ12ε2(1− δ1)ua11 − pi1λ12ε2δ1ua21 − pi2λ22ε2(1− δ1)ua12 − pi2λ22ε2δ1ua22
−pi1λ12(1− ε2)δ2ua11 − pi1λ12(1− ε2)(1− δ2)ua21 − pi2λ22(1− ε2)δ2ua12 − pi2λ22(1− ε2)(1− δ2)ua22)
+ε(1− 2ε2),
r˙22 = (1− ε2)(pi1λ12δ2ua11 + pi1λ12(1− δ2)ua21 + pi2λ22δ2ua12 + pi2λ22(1− δ2)ua22
−pi1λ12(1− ε2)δ2ua11 − pi1λ12(1− ε2)(1− δ2)ua21 − pi2λ22(1− ε2)δ2ua12 − pi2λ22(1− ε2)(1− δ2)ua22
−pi1λ12ε2(1− δ1)ua11 − pi1λ12ε2δ1ua21 − pi2λ22ε2(1− δ1)ua12 − pi2λ22ε2δ1ua22)
+ε(1− 2(1− ε2)),
z˙11 = (1− δ1)(pi1λ11(1− ε1)up11 + pi1λ12ε2up11 + pi2λ21(1− ε1)up12 + pi2λ22ε2up12
−pi1λ11(1− ε1)(1− δ1)up11 − pi1λ12ε2(1− δ1)up11 − pi2λ21(1− ε1)(1− δ1)up12 − pi2λ22ε2(1− δ1)up12
−pi1λ11(1− ε1)δ1up21 − pi1λ12ε2δ1up21 − pi2λ21(1− ε1)δ1up22 − pi2λ22ε2δ1up22)
+δ(1− 2(1− δ1)),
z˙12 = δ1(pi1λ11(1− ε1)up21 + pi1λ12ε2up21 + pi2λ21(1− ε1)up22 + pi2λ22ε2up22
−pi1λ11(1− ε1)δ1up21 − pi1λ12ε2δ1up21 − pi2λ21(1− ε1)δ1up22 − pi2λ22ε2δ1up22
−pi1λ11(1− ε1)(1− δ1)up11 − pi1λ12ε2(1− δ1)up11 − pi2λ21(1− ε1)(1− δ1)up12 − pi2λ22ε2(1− δ1)up12)
+δ(1− 2δ1),
z˙21 = δ2(pi1λ11ε1u
p
11 + pi1λ12(1− ε2)up11 + pi2λ21ε1up12 + pi2λ22(1− ε2)up12
−pi1λ11ε1(1− δ2)up21 − pi1λ12(1− ε2)(1− δ2)up21 − pi2λ21ε1(1− δ2)up22 − pi2λ22(1− ε2)(1− δ2)up22
−pi1λ11ε1δ2up11 − pi1λ12(1− ε2)δ2up11 − pi2λ21ε1δ2up12 − pi2λ22(1− ε2)δ2up12)
+δ(1− 2δ2),
z˙22 = (1− δ2)(pi1λ11ε1up21 + pi1λ12(1− ε2)up21 + pi2λ21ε1up22 + pi2λ22(1− ε2)up22
−pi1λ11ε1(1− δ2)up21 − pi1λ12(1− ε2)(1− δ2)up21 − pi2λ21ε1(1− δ2)up22 − pi2λ22(1− ε2)(1− δ2)up22
−pi1λ11ε1δ2up11 − pi1λ12(1− ε2)δ2up11 − pi2λ21ε1δ2up12 − pi2λ22(1− ε2)δ2up12)
+δ(1− 2(1− δ2)).
.
3See p 10 in this paper.
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r˙11 = pi1u
a
11 − pi1(1− α)ua11 − pi1αua21 = 0,
r˙12 = pi1u
a
21 − pi1αua21 − pi1(1− α)ua11 = 0,
r˙22 = 0,
z˙11 = 0,
z˙12 = 0,
z˙21 = 0,
z˙22 = 0.
Thus, this system has the rest point at the random action equilibrium (R4, Z4)
when ua11 = u
a
21.
Next, we check the stability of the random action equilibrium (R4, Z4). The
characteristic equation of the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the rest point (R4, Z4)
is given by
(λ+αua21− (1− 2α)ua11)(λ− (1− 2α)ua21+ (1−α)ua11)(λ− pi1ua12+ pi2ua22)(λ+
pi2u
a
22)(λ+ (1− α)pi1up11)(λ+ (1− α)pi1up21 + (1− α)pi1up11)(λ− pi1αup11 − pi2up12 +
pi1αu
p
21 + pi2u
p
22)(λ+ pi1αu
p
21 + pi2u
p
22) = 0, where λ is the eigenvalue.
Thus, this system can be structurally stable when −αua21 + (1 − 2α)ua11 <
0, (1− 2α)ua21− (1−α)ua11 < 0, pi2ua12− pi2ua22 < 0, up21− up11 < 0, pi1αup11+ pi2up12−
pi1αu
p
21 − pi2up22 < 0.
Proof of Theorem 6.1
Assuming that there is a rest point close to a partition equilibrium (R1, Z1),
we write down the rest point as follows:
R1 =
 1− ε1 ε1
ε2 1− ε2
 , Z1 =
 1− δ1 δ1
δ2 1− δ2
 .
Our dynamical system S˙ = Φ(S) of the selection–mutation dynamics consists
22
of 8 differential equations. 3 By substituting the entries (z˜ij , r˜ji) of (R
∗
1, Z
∗
1 ) into
8 differential equations, we obtain the following system:
r˙11 = (1− ε1)(pi1λ11(1− δ1)ua11 + pi1λ11δ1ua21 + pi2λ21(1− δ1)ua12 + pi2λ21δ1ua22
−pi1λ11(1− ε1)(1− δ1)ua11 − pi1λ11(1− ε1)δ1ua21 − pi2λ21(1− ε1)(1− δ1)ua12 − pi2λ21(1− ε1)δ1ua22
−pi1λ11ε1δ2ua11 − pi1λ11ε1(1− δ2)ua21 − pi2λ21ε1δ2ua12 − pi2λ21ε1(1− δ2)ua22)
+ε(1− 2(1− ε1)),
r˙12 = ε1(pi1λ11δ2u
a
11 + pi1λ11(1− δ2)ua21 + pi2λ21δ2ua12 + pi2λ21(1− δ2)ua22
−pi1λ11ε1δ2ua11 − pi1λ11ε1(1− δ2)ua21 − pi2λ21ε1δ2ua12 − pi2λ21ε1(1− δ2)ua22
−pi1λ11(1− ε1)(1− δ1)ua11 − pi1λ11(1− ε1)δ1ua21 − pi2λ21(1− ε1)(1− δ1)ua12 − pi2λ21(1− ε1)δ1ua22)
+ε(1− 2ε1),
r˙21 = ε2(pi1λ12(1− δ1)ua11 + pi1λ12δ1ua21 + pi2λ22(1− δ1)ua12 + pi2λ22δ1ua22
−pi1λ12ε2(1− δ1)ua11 − pi1λ12ε2δ1ua21 − pi2λ22ε2(1− δ1)ua12 − pi2λ22ε2δ1ua22
−pi1λ12(1− ε2)δ2ua11 − pi1λ12(1− ε2)(1− δ2)ua21 − pi2λ22(1− ε2)δ2ua12 − pi2λ22(1− ε2)(1− δ2)ua22)
+ε(1− 2ε2),
r˙22 = (1− ε2)(pi1λ12δ2ua11 + pi1λ12(1− δ2)ua21 + pi2λ22δ2ua12 + pi2λ22(1− δ2)ua22
−pi1λ12(1− ε2)δ2ua11 − pi1λ12(1− ε2)(1− δ2)ua21 − pi2λ22(1− ε2)δ2ua12 − pi2λ22(1− ε2)(1− δ2)ua22
−pi1λ12ε2(1− δ1)ua11 − pi1λ12ε2δ1ua21 − pi2λ22ε2(1− δ1)ua12 − pi2λ22ε2δ1ua22)
+ε(1− 2(1− ε2)),
z˙11 = (1− δ1)(pi1λ11(1− ε1)up11 + pi1λ12ε2up11 + pi2λ21(1− ε1)up12 + pi2λ22ε2up12
−pi1λ11(1− ε1)(1− δ1)up11 − pi1λ12ε2(1− δ1)up11 − pi2λ21(1− ε1)(1− δ1)up12 − pi2λ22ε2(1− δ1)up12
−pi1λ11(1− ε1)δ1up21 − pi1λ12ε2δ1up21 − pi2λ21(1− ε1)δ1up22 − pi2λ22ε2δ1up22)
+δ(1− 2(1− δ1)),
z˙12 = δ1(pi1λ11(1− ε1)up21 + pi1λ12ε2up21 + pi2λ21(1− ε1)up22 + pi2λ22ε2up22
−pi1λ11(1− ε1)δ1up21 − pi1λ12ε2δ1up21 − pi2λ21(1− ε1)δ1up22 − pi2λ22ε2δ1up22
−pi1λ11(1− ε1)(1− δ1)up11 − pi1λ12ε2(1− δ1)up11 − pi2λ21(1− ε1)(1− δ1)up12 − pi2λ22ε2(1− δ1)up12)
+δ(1− 2δ1),
z˙21 = δ2(pi1λ11ε1u
p
11 + pi1λ12(1− ε2)up11 + pi2λ21ε1up12 + pi2λ22(1− ε2)up12
−pi1λ11ε1(1− δ2)up21 − pi1λ12(1− ε2)(1− δ2)up21 − pi2λ21ε1(1− δ2)up22 − pi2λ22(1− ε2)(1− δ2)up22
−pi1λ11ε1δ2up11 − pi1λ12(1− ε2)δ2up11 − pi2λ21ε1δ2up12 − pi2λ22(1− ε2)δ2up12)
+δ(1− 2δ2),
z˙22 = (1− δ2)(pi1λ11ε1up21 + pi1λ12(1− ε2)up21 + pi2λ21ε1up22 + pi2λ22(1− ε2)up22
−pi1λ11ε1(1− δ2)up21 − pi1λ12(1− ε2)(1− δ2)up21 − pi2λ21ε1(1− δ2)up22 − pi2λ22(1− ε2)(1− δ2)up22
−pi1λ11ε1δ2up11 − pi1λ12(1− ε2)δ2up11 − pi2λ21ε1δ2up12 − pi2λ22(1− ε2)δ2up12)
+δ(1− 2(1− δ2)).
.
3See p 10 in this paper.
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We remove redundant equations r˙ij and z˙ji for i = j = 1 and i = j = 2.
Let Df denote the Jacobian matrix of r˙ij and z˙ji with respect to ε1, ε2, δ1 and
δ2, that is,
Df =

∂r˙12
∂ε1
∂r˙12
∂ε2
∂r˙12
∂δ1
∂r˙12
∂δ2
∂r˙21
∂ε1
∂r˙21
∂ε2
∂r˙21
∂δ1
∂r˙21
∂δ2
∂z˙12
∂ε1
∂z˙12
∂ε2
∂z˙12
∂δ1
∂z˙12
∂δ2
∂z˙12
∂ε1
∂z˙21
∂ε2
∂z˙21
∂δ1
∂z˙21
∂δ2
 .
Let det (Df(x)) denote the determinant ofDf(x) at point x = (ε1, ε2, δ1, δ2; ε, δ).
Since
Df(0)
=

pi1λ11u
a
21 + pi2λ21u
a
22 − pi1λ11ua11 − pi2λ21ua12 0 0 0
0 pi1λ12u
a
11 + pi2λ22u
a
12 − pi1λ12ua21 − pi2λ22ua22 0 0
0 0 pi1λ11u
p
21 + pi2λ21u
p
22 − pi1λ11up11 − pi2λ21up12 0
0 0 0 pi1λ12u
p
11 + pi2λ22u
p
12 − pi1λ12up21 − pi2λ22up22

at the point (ε1, ε2, δ1, δ2; ε, δ) = (0, 0, 0, 0; 0, 0), we have Df(0) ̸= 0 when
pi1λ11u
a
21 + pi2λ21u
a
22 − pi1λ11ua11 − pi2λ22ua12 ̸= 0,
pi1λ12u
a
11 + pi2λ22u
a
12 − pi1λ12ua21 − pi2λ22ua22 ̸= 0,
pi1λ11u
p
21 + pi2λ21u
p
22 − pi1λ11up11 − pi2λ21up12 ̸= 0,
pi1λ12u
p
11 + pi2λ22u
p
12 − pi1λ12up21 − pi2λ22up22 ̸= 0.
Proof of Corollary 1
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
ε1(ε, δ)
ε2(ε, δ)
δ1(ε, δ)
δ2(ε, δ)
 =

ε1(0, 0)
ε2(0, 0)
δ1(0, 0)
δ2(0, 0)
+

∂ε1
∂ε (0, 0)
∂ε1
∂δ (0, 0)
∂ε2
∂ε (0, 0)
∂ε2
∂δ (0, 0)
∂δ1
∂ε (0, 0)
∂δ1
∂δ (0, 0)
∂δ2
∂ε (0, 0)
∂δ2
∂δ (0, 0)

 ε
δ
+

o1(ε, δ)
o2(ε, δ)
o3(ε, δ)
o4(ε, δ)
 .
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Because (ε1(0, 0), ε2(0, 0), δ1(0, 0), δ2(0, 0)) is a solution of the system
fI(ε1(0, 0), ε2(0, 0), δ1(0, 0), δ2(0, 0); 0, 0) = 0, I = 1, 2, 3, 4, we obtain
(ε1(0, 0), ε2(0, 0), δ1(0, 0), δ2(0, 0)) = (0, 0, 0, 0).
By the implicit function theorem and the fact that
Df(0) =
pi1λ11u
a
21 + pi2λ21u
a
22 − pi1λ11ua11 − pi2λ21ua12 0 0 0
0 pi1λ12u
a
11 + pi2λ22u
a
12 − pi1λ12ua21 − pi2λ22ua22 0 0
0 0 pi1λ11u
p
21 + pi2λ21u
p
22 − pi1λ11up11 − pi2λ21up12 0
0 0 0 pi1λ12u
p
11 + pi2λ22u
p
12 − pi1λ12up21 − pi2λ22up22
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∂δ (0)
∂f2
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∂δ (0)
∂f3
∂ε (0)
∂f3
∂δ (0)
∂f4
∂ε (0)
∂f4
∂δ (0)

= −(Df(0)−1)−1

1 0
1 0
0 1
0 1

=

1
pi1λ11ua11+pi2λ21u
a
12−pi1λ11ua21−pi2λ21ua22 0
1
pi1λ12ua21+pi2λ22u
a
22−pi1λ12ua11−pi2λ22ua12 0
0 1
pi1λ11u
p
11+pi2λ21u
p
12−pi1λ11up21−pi2λ21up22
0 1
pi1λ12u
p
21+pi2λ22u
p
22−pi1λ12up11−pi2λ22up12
 ,
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We remove redundant equations r˙ij and z˙ji for i = j = 1 and i = j = 2.
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∂δ2
 .
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0 1
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where 0 = (0, 0, 0, 0; 0, 0). Thus, Tayler’s formula described above becomes

ε1(ε, δ)
ε2(ε, δ)
δ1(ε, δ)
δ2(ε, δ)
 =

ε1(0, 0)
ε2(0, 0)
δ1(0, 0)
δ2(0, 0)
+

∂ε1
∂ε (0, 0)
∂ε1
∂δ (0, 0)
∂ε2
∂ε (0, 0)
∂ε2
∂δ (0, 0)
∂δ1
∂ε (0, 0)
∂δ1
∂δ (0, 0)
∂δ2
∂ε (0, 0)
∂δ2
∂δ (0, 0)

 ε
δ
+

o1(ε, δ)
o2(ε, δ)
o3(ε, δ)
o4(ε, δ)

=

1
pi1λ11ua11+pi2λ21u
a
12−pi1λ11ua21−pi2λ21ua22 0
1
pi1λ12ua21+pi2λ22u
a
22−pi1λ12ua11−pi2λ22ua12 0
0 1
pi1λ11u
p
11+pi2λ21u
p
12−pi1λ11up21−pi2λ21up22
0 1
pi1λ12u
p
21+pi2λ22u
p
22−pi1λ12up11−pi2λ22up12

 ε
δ

+

o1(ε, δ)
o2(ε, δ)
o3(ε, δ)
o4(ε, δ)
 ,
where oI(ε, δ), I = 1, 2, 3, 4, stands for the second- or higher-order terms of ε
and δ. Thus, we obtain the first-order approximated values of ε1, ε2, δ1 and δ2,
respectively, as follows:
ε1 =
1
pi1λ11ua11+pi2λ21u
a
12−pi1λ11ua21−pi2λ21ua22 ε+ o1(ε, δ),
ε2 =
1
pi1λ12ua21+pi2λ22u
a
22−pi1λ12ua11−pi2λ22ua12 ε+ o2(ε, δ),
δ1 =
1
pi1λ11u
p
11+pi2λ21u
p
12−pi1λ11up21−pi2λ21up22
δ + o3(ε, δ),
δ2 =
1
pi1λ12u
p
21+pi2λ22u
p
22−pi1λ12up11−pi2λ22up12
δ + o4(ε, δ).
We find the first-order approximated rest point. □
Proof of Theorem 6.2
Suppose that Λ = I, pi1 = pi2 =
1
2 , U
A =
 1 0
0 12
 , and UP =
 1 0
1
2 2
.
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In this case, the characteristic equation of the first-order approximated Jaco-
bian matrix evaluated at the rest point close to the partition equilibrium is given
by (λ− ε− 2δ+ 12)(λ+ ε− 92δ+ 12)(λ+ 34ε− 54δ+ 14)(λ− 12ε+4δ+ 14)(λ− ε− 2δ+
1
2)(λ− ε+1)(λ+ 12ε)(λ+ 12ε+ 12δ+ 12)2 = 0, where λ is the eigenvalue. Thus, this
system is structurally stable.
Without perturbations, ε = δ = 0. Thus, this characteristic equation has zero
eigenvalue. It is structurally unstable.
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